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Barry Markovsky
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ABSTRACT
Social psychology stands to benefit from multilevel theories that link
it to both lower and higher levels of analysis. Making the link,
however, requires a level of theoretical rigor heretofore relatively
uncommon in the social sciences. After refuting several common
objections to this brand of theorizing, I offer a rationale and a set
of criteria for multilevel theory construction.
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INTRODUCTION
Several years ago, just before flying out to give a series of talks, I
went to see a doctor. I had a lingering cold and wanted to see if
there was any precaution--or drug--that I could take to prevent the
changes in cabin pressure from making my head explode. The doctor
asked where I was going and I responded, half facetiously, that I was
going to give some talks on making sociology more scientific. He was
surprised. He said, "I thought sociologists use a lot of statistics."
I told him that they do, but that using statistics is not the same as
being scientific. The key, I said, is how they state their claims and
what they then do with those claims. In the 45 seconds he spent with
me I could not really explore the idea. Consequently, I think he
didn't really understand what I meant. But had he understood he might
have been a better doctor, and my head would not have exploded during
the plane's descent that evening.
In sociology and elsewhere, working in a scientific mode has little
to do with the stereotypical trappings of science. Quantitative data
analysis is not essential. Neither are laboratories, mathematical
theories, journals or conferences--though all of these can be put to
good use. If there is an essence to science, it lies in how we
express our claims and in what happens to them as a result of that
expression.
There is now an emerging body of perspectives and theories that
some of us have dubbed "structural social psychology" (Lawler,
Ridgeway and Markovsky 1993). It is bursting with potential, and will
have some sort of a life span whether or not its proponents operate

scientifically. Here, however, I will argue that the quality of that
life will be compromised if we do not devote special attention to the
expression of claims and to how those expressions are treated. In
other words, the integrative, multilevel approach that is implied by
the label "structural social psychology" is even more subject to
pitfalls of pseudo-scientific temptations than less integrative,
single-level approaches.
PSEUDO-CRITICISMS
To anticipate some familiar criticisms, I want to first emphasize that
it is neither arrogant nor fetishistic to argue this position. On the
contrary, most sociologists who adopt scientifically rigorous methods
tend to be very modest. They know that they cannot accept credit for
inventing their approach and that their work is but a fine thread in
a very broad fabric. Furthermore, it seems that some formal theorists
become more concerned with building theoretical castles in the air
than with explaining empirical phenomena. However, much too frequently
we see reviewers and critics tarring any formal theory with this same
brush, even those associated with long-standing programs of
empirical research.
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Second, the position is not narrow. On the contrary, it is
boundless. Narrowness would imply that it rules out too much. But
what actually gets ruled out includes claims that cannot be tested;
claims that can be tested, but have failed to survive empirical tests;
and claims that contain self-contradictions, ambiguities, or invalid
arguments. In short, we exclude the untestable, the false and the
fuzzy. There are actually very few substantive interests in our field
that are outside the realm of scientific inquiry. So the approach is
not narrow in that sense.
The narrowness critique is also leveled at issues of argumentation.
We hear that adopting rigorous theoretical language precludes
important issues such as human reflexivity, capriciousness, and other
ethereal qualities. This is patently false. Rigor only demands that
the theorist states defining properties for concepts such as
reflexivity and capriciousness and that he or she provides statements
relating these terms to others in the theory. Also, if reflexivity
and capriciousness do not matter for a particular theoretical
purpose, then there is no obligation that they be in the theory, even
if they happen to be universal human qualities.
Another facet of the narrowness critique is that scientific
standards demand too much of sociological arguments, and thereby
stifle them. This claim has a surface reasonableness until one
examines it a little more closely. It suggests that lowered standards
are justified because our subject matter is difficult. It is not easy
to come up with really tight, solid theories, so we should settle for
looser, feebler ones. It also suggests that we are justified in
dissuading one another and our students from scrutinizing theories too
carefully, that doing so shows a sort of fetish with form over content.
But we must remember that, when the form is not there, neither is the

content. If structural social psychologists want to adopt standards
that allow or promote ambiguity of terms and invalidity of arguments,
then they must be prepared to admit that they have no theoretical
standards. As a group, we do not want this to occur because it will
totally politicize the testing, acceptance and rejection of theories.
To deflect a third common criticism: all else being equal, rigorous
arguments are not generally more difficult to understand than looser
ones. I am baffled by those who assert that, by not defining their
terms and by not subjecting their own arguments to logical analysis,
they are somehow producing a work that is more easily communicated.
If communicating a theory means getting others to share one's
understanding of its terms, its claims and its consequences, then one
must tell them what those terms mean and how to go about deriving the
same conclusions. By not defining terms, one allows the uncritical
consumer to experience a feeling of comprehension since the consumer
has inferred his or her own meanings. These are unlikely to be the
theorist's intended meanings, however, and so communication has not
really taken place at all.
[page 32]
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Fourth, scientific theorizing is not mere rhetoric, any more than
a book consists of mere letters on pages. Theories build codified
systems of meaning. If those systems develop in conjunction with
stringent testing, then they will have empirical import that reaches
beyond unaided insights and intuitions.
THEORY VS. QUASI-THEORY
If structural social psychology develops in accord with other
sociological sub-disciplines, then it will probably be long on quasitheorizing and short on theory-building. By "quasi-theorizing" I mean
efforts to develop perspectives, interpretive schemes, metatheories,
agendas, and the like. I want to urge structural social psychologists
to learn to distinguish these from a narrower, but more useful,
definition of "theorizing" because there are some crucial differences:
Unlike theories, quasi-theories are not held to any consistent set of
communicative, logical, or empirical standards.
Quasi-theories best serve when they inspire us to theorize, but are
pointless when mistaken for theories and debated as to their truthfulness. Most of what is called sociological theorizing is debate over
quasi-theories. As such, along with others in sociology and the other
sciences, I think it is worth reserving the term "theory" for a more
restricted class of objects, namely sets of logically related
statements comprised of well-defined terms that survive harsh tests.
QUALITIES AND CONSEQUENCES OF THEORETICAL RIGOR
Interestingly, despite all the talk for and against scientific
theorizing in sociology, such theorizing is not so much an ideological
starting point as it is the result of implementing a small set of
conventions. Taken one at a time, those conventions are much
less debatable and controversial than more diffuse questions about

whether sociology can or should be scientific. These are summarized in
Table 1, a list of eight desirable qualities for theories. I will
briefly summarize them here, referring those who desire more detail to
Cohen (1989).
TABLE 1: GENERAL PROPERTIES OF THEORETICAL STATEMENTS
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)

free of contradiction
free of ambivalence
communicable
abstract
general
precise
parsimonious
conditional
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(1) A theory containing a contradiction loses all explanatory power
because any such argument is always logically false, whatever its
content.
(2) Ambivalent statements such as "gender may affect attitudes" are
ineffectual in theories because they are always logically true,
regardless of content.
(3) Communicability requires theories to be accessible to
interested others--adherents and skeptics alike--so that they can
understand the theory well enough to submit it to stringent tests.
(4) Abstractness is the quality of not being bound to specific
objects, times and places. Theories help to explain particulars, but
also must transcend them. Abstract theories often contain terms unlike
any used in everyday discourse. Though perhaps counterintuitive to
some, this can be a great asset when the terms are well-chosen and
sharply defined insofar as theories are supposed to provide insights
which go beyond everyday points of view and familiar empirical
instances.
(5) Theories are general to the extent that their statements are
both interpretable and corroborated for a large number and variety of
cases. The criterion of abstractness does not anchor the theory in
empirical reality; the criterion of generality does. Interpretability
thus requires the terms of the theory to be connected to many and
varied empirical instances, whereas corroboration requires that the
theoretical assertions built from those terms are verified through
observation.
(6) Theories are precise to the degree that they generate accurate
and detailed statements about phenomena.
(7) The criterion of parsimony demands that, all else being equal,
smaller theories are preferred to larger ones. If Theory A can
generate the same hypotheses as Theory B while employing fewer terms
and fewer assumptions, then Theory A is preferred. Parsimony

facilitates communicability and provides greater opportunity to
explore logical entailments.
(8) Finally, Cohen (1989) cites three ways that theories are
conditional: (i) They contain chains of logically related conditional
statements that predicate the state or level of one concept on that of
another. Without these types of statements there is nothing to test.
(ii) Initial conditions[1] employ definitions of terms to bridge the
theoretical and empirical realms, allowing us to derive hypotheses
about real-world phenomena. (iii) Scope statements formulate domains
within which hypotheses may be tested. Without them, a theorist is
either deceiving herself or trying to deceive others as to the true
generality of his or her theory.
[page 34]
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By offering these criteria, I am not implying that
ourselves to think in ways that avoid their violation
forms of scholarly discourse that fail to measure up.
may be born of illogical and ill-defined progenitors.
point is to know the difference.

we must force
or to avoid all
Good theorizing
The critical

A variety of methods satisfy the eight criteria. One need not
decide upon a particular method of constructing theories. Rather, as
one works with a theory, trying to balance such qualities as
parsimony, generality and communicability, one finds oneself becoming
interested in properties of the conceptual system and the logical
structure of the arguments.
In general, these methods promote a kind of openness that, in turn,
promote cumulative growth. When enough people in a field agree that
it is the terms and relations of explicit theoretical statements that
are to be the focus of debate and research, then it no longer matters
who wrote them, what he or she "really" meant, or who believes that
it does or does not matter. Egos are removed from the loop, and
theoretical analysis and critique rise above latent or manifest
meanness. It also relieves individuals of the burden of trying to
convince others that they know a great deal, and focuses attention on
what really matters: whether the theory explains what it is supposed
to. To borrow an abstract and general notion of Shakespeare's, the
theory's the thing.
Another reason for adhering to these criteria is avoiding the error
of reification, a confusion of the symbolic elements of the theory
with some "reality" to which it purportedly applies. Theoretical
statements create a virtual reality, a system of idealized entities,
relations and processes that possess only the properties assigned to
them by the theorist, along with whatever consequences follow from
those assignments. As such, the theory is a sort of artificial lens
through which we may view certain phenomena and see things that we
might not have otherwise. Problems arise when one assumes that the
statements of a theory do more than this, that they are "descriptive"
of empirical phenomena or can be used as "sensitizing" frameworks.
Empirical description and creative interpretation are essential to
the theory-building process. However, any conception of theories that

permits them to possess these qualities will be a weak one. At
minimum, the product sacrifices communicability, abstractness and
generality. On the other hand, the theorist must build the virtual
reality with some care, since all that s/he wishes to say with the
theory, and none of what s/he wishes not to say, must be communicated
to others. The benefit is protection against misinterpretations,
misapplications, and inappropriate tests.
[page 35]
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MULTILEVEL THEORIES
For the present purposes, adopting norms of explicit and rigorous
theorizing provide another important service: they facilitate
multilevel theory-building. Beautiful and useful multilevel theories
have developed in virtually all other scientific fields. Furthermore,
current knowledge about social systems is comparable to premultilevel conceptions in these other fields: (1) A fair amount is
known about the properties and behaviors of micro and macro level
units; (2) there is some consensus among scholars with macro interests
that, for certain problems, understanding micro foundations may be
useful; and (3) many scholars with micro interests want to
demonstrate the macro implications of their ideas. When cross-level
connections are forged, complexities get bracketed and simplified,
and new theoretical tasks are placed into clearer focus.
Sociology and social psychology have some superb multilevel
theories with varying degrees of development and activity. Here I
will mention just two areas, but note that there are several others.
First, theories employing social network models are often among the
most explicitly and naturally multilevel. They generally consider
causal interactions bridging across structures, sub-structures,
positions, and sometimes actors in positions. Ronald Burt's (1981)
"Toward a Structural Theory of Social Action," James Coleman's (1990)
"Foundations of Social Theory," and Thomas Fararo's (1989) "The
Meaning of General Theoretical Sociology" are notably rigorous in
their integration of models of the interests and judgments of humans
in relational structures, organizations, stratification systems or
institutions.
A second area showing multilevel theoretical activity was inspired
by the so-called "problem of collective action": self-interested
actors come to invest resources for collective goods rather than
refusing to contribute and simply enjoying the benefits. This work
has a strong multilevel flavor and fits squarely with the structural
social psychology agenda. It is directed at explaining emergent group
phenomena based on mutually contingent choices of actors in those
groups. The most rigorous of this research uses computer simulations
to express with precision its theoretical assumptions and to capture
dynamics too complex for intuitive approaches. Theories of Oliver and
Marwell (Oliver, Marwell and Teixeira 1985; Oliver and Marwell 1988a,
1988b), Heckathorn (1988, 1989, 1990) and Macy (1990, 1991a, 1991b)
are exemplary, and to varying degrees integrate network structural
models.

Ironically, in the several volumes on micro-macro linkages in
sociology that have appeared in the last decade, multilevel theories
such as those noted above are scarcely cited. Most of the talk
concerns strategies for theorizing rather than actual theorizing. For
example, there is much debate about what conceptual linkages are
best, without concomitant efforts to develop theories that utilize
those concepts and linkages.
[page 36]
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MULTILEVEL CRITERIA
Having explored the concept of multilevel theories, let us now
consider a set of general criteria for them. The actual criteria
exist in set theoretic language (manuscript available from the
author), but also lend themselves rather well to the less formal
summarization below. In this scheme, multilevel theories extend
unilevel theories, which, in turn, are aggregates of theoretical
building blocks called "theory units." As shown in Table 2, a theory
unit is a set with five elements, each of which is also a set:
TABLE 2: THEORY UNIT
TU ==
C =
S =
P =

{C, S, P}, where
theoretical concepts
scope statements
two conditional theoretical statements, e.g., "If x1, then y1"
and "If x2 then y2", logically linked so that y1 = x2.

Note: "==" indicates an "equivalence" relation
Theoretical statements and scope statements consist of theoretical
concepts and logical connectives. Some concepts are expressed as
primitive (undefined) terms, and the rest are defined terms where
definitions consist of primitive terms and/or previously defined
terms. Logical connectives are defined outside of the theory, e.g.,
through a particular mathematical branch. Theoretical statements
are known by such labels as axioms, propositions, premises, or
assumptions. In short, the TU is a knowledge generator, bringing
together defined terms and logically connected statements in an
explicit domain.
In turn, theories are comprised of interconnected TUs, those
interconnections being defined by the criteria shown in Table 3.
Simply stated, the TUs must overlap in their scope, language and
logic.
TABLE 3: CRITERIA FOR THEORIES
Given more than one TU, a theory exists if and only if
(1) all have at least some shared S
(2) each has C shared with at least one other
(3) each logically connects with at least one other
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Thus, theory units only combine to form a theory when they all have at
least one scope statement in common. Otherwise, some theoretical
statements would not be applicable under the same conditions for
which other statements would apply. The second condition requires that
every TU intersect with at least one other TU, thereby providing a
conceptual "interface" through which TUs may inform one another. To
then require logical connections among TUs means simply that each TU
must have either an antecedent clause ("x" in "If x...") that also
serves as a consequent ("y" in "...then y") in another TU, or the
reverse. This permits TUs to be linked into longer chains of
theoretical reasoning.
Multilevel theories (Table 4) require two further sets of criteria:
TABLE 4: CRITERIA FOR MULTILEVEL THEORIES
(1) Containment Conditions
(a) there are statements at two or more levels of analysis
(b) units at higher levels contain units at lower levels
(c) a higher-level unit contains multiple lower-level units
(2) Bridging Conditions
(a) there is a conditional statement in which the level of the
antecedent differs from that of the consequent, or
(b) the subject of the higher-level statement is defined in terms
of the lower-level subject.
Containment conditions ensure that there are at least two distinct
units of analysis in the theory with multiple instances of one unit
contained within single instances of the other. The latter condition
both reflects the way multilevel theorizing is implemented in other
sciences and rules out trivial cases of single-instance lower-level
units, e.g., an army of one.
The bridging conditions allow two kinds of cross-level linkages.
First, there may be a conditional statement that links two levels of
analysis, e.g., "If actors make only short-run self-interested
judgments, then the social system they comprise will disintegrate at
an accelerating rate." Second, the link may be accomplished through a
definition, e.g., "A class system exists if and only if socioeconomic
strata form a transitive hierarchy."
Although it is not my purpose in this brief document to contrast
the foregoing criteria with alternative formulations, it should be
useful to draw a few comparisons with Coleman's (1987, 1990) popular
argument for micro-macro linkage in sociology.
[page 38]
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Coleman's mission was to offer guidelines for explaining the
relationship between a macro antecedent and a macro consequent by

bridging to a micro level of analysis. This allows, for example, the
explanation of the effects of Protestantism on capitalism by (1)
bridging from Protestantism "down" to particular values held by
individuals, (2) from those values "across" to certain individual
economic behaviors, and then (3) "up" to capitalism. In Coleman's
discussions, the "macro" always refers to a social system and the
"micro" is always thought of as individual persons.
Coleman thus offered criteria (of a sort) for one kind of
multilevel theory, a type that is and should be of great interest to
many sociologists. In contrast to what I have offered, however, he did
not set out to incorporate more fundamental criteria from the realm
of theory construction, i.e., the semantic and logical requisites for
well-formed theories, or the role to be played by scope conditions.
Furthermore, he neither addressed nor ruled out alternative
multilevel theoretical patterns which are explicitly permitted in my
conceptualization. For example, a theory that only explains a micro
process in terms of a macro condition could satisfy my criteria but
not Coleman's. Importantly, in fact, much of what constitutes
multilevel theorizing in other scientific disciplines would not
conform to Coleman's specification. Finally, Coleman restricted his
units of analysis to individual humans and to social systems. Again,
while these units hold much interest for sociologists and others,
they are not the only units that may be incorporated into multilevel
social scientific theories. For example, Network Exchange Theory
(Markovsky, Willer and Patton 1988; Lovaglia, Skvoretz, Willer and
Markovsky 1995) simultaneously incorporates assumptions about
individual judgments and actions, dyadic exchange conditions and
processes, and social network configurations.
STRUCTURAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: AN EMERGING PSEUDO-SCIENCE?
It will be tempting to not bother with criteria such as these. They
require time and attention, and the payoffs in theory are largely
unappreciated. By ignoring them, however, we can be assured that
structural social psychology will come to manifest many of the
hallmarks of pseudoscience (e.g., Radner and Radner 1982). For
instance, with "research by exegesis," the words of esteemed others-usually deceased--are taken as sage and beyond question. All that
remains is to interpret specific cases in light of this received
wisdom. Another hallmark is "looking for mysteries." For us, this
means chasing after and trying to explain particular interesting
phenomena in an ad hoc manner. Other markers of pseudoscience include
a grab-bag use of evidence, offering irrefutable hypotheses,
explanation by scenario, and refusal to revise in light of criticism.
All of these warning signs are flashing in various corners of our
discipline, sometimes near the center, too, and sometimes in bright
colors and stunning combinations. We ought to avoid them, but we need
to first educate ourselves about them.
[page 39]
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CONCLUSION: THE EVOLUTION OF NEBULOUSNESS
To conclude, I would like to describe a process that I will call

the evolution of nebulousness. Evolutionary epistemologists have
likened theory growth to evolution by natural selection. Ideas,
whatever their sources, are thrown into keen competition with one
another. Survival depends on relative fitness, or resistance to
empirical falsification. Natural selection is uncompromising. When one
species is less fit than another, its environmental impact diminishes
along with its members. Similarly, when a scientific collective is
uncompromising in applying stringent theoretical criteria, unfit ideas
diminish in their impact.
Whereas natural selection is a physical process, idea selection has
a visible hand. The human factor comes into play, and the
evolutionary epistemology can break down if left unattended. When the
eight basic criteria are not collectively enforced, what evolves
instead of knowledge is nebulousness, the progeny of which are unfit
ideas kept alive by extraordinary means. The proponents of such ideas
hide them behind perspectives, frameworks and metatheories, never
really putting them to the test. They appear to live on--if one could
call that living. But there is a stiff price paid in improvements
forgone.
Astrologers are proud of the fact that their essential ideas have
remained unchanged for around two millennia. As we know, however,
their language of prediction excludes practically nothing, so the
ideas do not improve. The field is stable not because it works so
well, but because it is utterly stagnant.
Structural social psychology, with a domain and range that is
perhaps broader than those of either sociology or social psychology,
could be the astronomy of the social sciences. This can be
accomplished without sacrificing any of our substantive interests-families, emotions, personality, networks, perceptions, self, status,
justice, power, etc. We must continually check the semantic and logical
structures of our own theories and those of others, and we must train
our students to do so as well. Further, we must lay bare the flaws that
we discover and focus our attention on them, rather than trying to
sweep them under the rug with irrelevant rhetoric. Yet, without a
collective interest in upholding stringent criteria for the semantic
and logical structures of our multilevel theories, structural social
psychology will only be another in a series of social astrologies that
have retreated into nebulousness or passed on with their founders.
[page 40]
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ENDNOTES
[1] As pointed out by a reviewer, this is not the only meaning for the
expression "initial condition." It is perhaps better known in the
empirical sciences as the set of starting values for the parameters of
a dynamic process.
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